As recently as May, Chinese state-supported espionage campaigns have targeted telecommunications and transportation hubs related to the U.S. military base in Guam and the base itself. Microsoft reported that malicious code had been placed within telecommunications networks on Guam to trigger alarms and disrupt maritime operations on the island.
It’s no secret — China is spying on us. It’s time for the United States to respond, and the first order of business must be to diplomatically expand broadband services.
Spectrum allocation — the assignment of different radio frequencies for specific uses — is one area where security and U.S. government leadership must improve to prevent future attacks. Increasing commercial spectrum capacity and allocation will allow the United States to market the most cutting-edge 5G services for foreign businesses and governments concerned about cybersecurity.
As of 2022, almost 92 percent of Americans had access to fixed broadband. The ability to access an internet connection for homeowners, businesses and governments rests on having a solid broadband network and structure. Without it, gaps in coverage leave entire areas of the country out of economic benefits and information sharing, and, most crucially, allow other actors to offer their own broadband services with strings attached.
Evidence suggests that Chinese state-affiliated corporations have been marketing, installing and harvesting information from multiple countries’ utilities, communications networks and private companies. Chinese state-backed corporations have acquired more than half of the southern electrical distribution market share in Chile. Chinese ownership of Brazilian transmission and distribution of electricity has risen to 12 percent in 2023. Massive data thefts in the last decade from Equifax, Marriott, and the U.S. Office of Personnel Management have given the Chinese government vast amounts of personal information. These breaches and ownership of utilities give China access to crucial information on a country’s power supply and the location of related broadband infrastructure.
The United States could leverage broadband to help countries build and secure their 5G networks. For example, small island nations in the Western Pacific rely on satellite-based internet connections, which are slow even if the weather is clear. With the Chinese Communist Party having successfully signed a security agreement with the nearby Solomon Islands in 2022, many small Western Pacific nations worry that the Solomons will become a foothold as China expands its influence eastward.
The United States still has a clear advantage over China in manufacturing the infrastructure to construct and secure broadband 5G services. We have already taken the lead in bringing together coalitions in the Western Pacific to build critical broadband infrastructure. The East Micronesia Cable Project is a collaborative initiative by the United States, Australia, Kiribati, Nauru and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) to construct an undersea cable connecting more than 100,000 people in Nauru, Kiribati and FSM. Helping stitch together a secure broadband network in this region of the Pacific will guard against Chinese attempts to expand further into the Pacific through successful marketing of broadband service through state-affiliated companies. Building secure networks across these strategically important islands also carries a dual military use, as the United States and its allies would have access to a secure internet network.
China has favored low-frequency transmission for 5G services, which places it at an advantage in marketing 5G services to countries and businesses with little or no internet infrastructure. China may have advantages in inexpensive manufacturing of the necessary materials for broadband infrastructure, but the ability of the United States to successfully market its 5G networks depends on spectrum allocation. Targeting high- and mid-spectrum allocations for companies to begin servicing through FCC auctions would incentivize companies to compete against China in servicing spectrum within the United States and elsewhere.
Countering China in spectrum allocation does require Congress to reauthorize the FCC to host spectrum auctions in the first place. The last spectrum auction was in March. Since then, China has continued to test the U.S.’s cybersecurity capabilities and make massive investments in the Pacific islands’ infrastructure, including establishing internet service.
If the United States is serious about countering China’s influence, it must reauthorize the FCC to conduct auctions for needed crucial spectrum allocations. This would give us another spectrum that we could use to push back against China.
