When the Donald Trump administration announced on Oct. 30 that the United States would “immediately” resume nuclear-weapons testing for the first time in three decades, it signaled more than a shift in defense policy. It exposed a fundamental misreading of deterrence in the nuclear age. What seems like a restoration of strategic strength may, in fact, be a sign of strategic anxiety.
The announcement came at an already tense geopolitical moment. Busan, South Korea, hosted a summit between Trump and Xi Jinping of China, just as Washington accused Beijing of doubling its arsenal and Moscow had started showcasing exotic new nuclear-capable delivery systems. Trump told Congress and the world that he wanted America to be “on an equal basis” with other nuclear powers. But beyond the bold language lies a grave question: What is deterrence meant to do today, and have we lost sight of its purpose?
Deterrence worked during the Cold War when the logic was simple: Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) forced both sides to calculate carefully before pulling the trigger. Under that model, strategic signaling mattered, but it was backed by clear doctrine and rational actors. Today’s environment is different. New delivery systems, asymmetric war-fighting, rising nuclear states, and deep structural uncertainty mean the old rules no longer apply.
Consider the heavy reliance on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), such as the LGM-30G Minuteman III. A recent audit by the Government Accountability Office found that the U.S. Air Force now expects those missiles can be maintained through 2050 – largely because their planned replacement, the LGM 35 Sentinel program, is delayed and badly over budget. The effect is clear: an aging arsenal, stretched infrastructure, and a politically driven push to make the missile leg of the triad visible again.
Trump’s call to resume testing is less about technical necessity and more about signaling. His claim that “other countries test, and we should too” may strike a chord domestically, but it risks miscalibrating strategic perception. The question is not simply whether the U.S. is stronger. The question is whether our adversaries believe we are rational. In nuclear affairs, credibility depends not only on capability but on calculability.
When Moscow or Beijing measure Washington’s resolve, they ask: Will the U.S. act predictably when pressed? Or will the noise around testing, modernization, and posture shifts trigger miscalculation? By reopening talk of explosive tests, Washington may be inviting just the sort of chain reaction that arms-control treaties and moratoria were meant to prevent.
The other side of signaling is how allies and adversaries interpret it. U.S. allies in Europe and Asia look for reassurance: that America’s extended nuclear umbrella remains firm, that Washington will not resort to first use lightly. U.S. adversaries watch for vulnerability, unpredictability, and gaps they can exploit. The message of “we’re going to test” may boost reassurance for some, but for many others it simply amplifies a perception of instability.
Deterrence is hardly about shouting louder than your rivals. It is about convincing them you will act rationally in the worst unfolding. That is why arms control matters. Even non-explosive tests, which Washington now says may be the limit for now, carry weight in signaling. If the U.S. conducts an underground or atmospheric nuclear explosion, it may be the clearest signal yet that restraint has gone out the window. Yet even the talk of testing has generated reaction. Iran condemned the move as hypocritical given U.S. objections to Tehran’s nuclear program. Moscow said it was “assessing options.” Beijing called it a destabilizing break with long-standing norms.
There is one irony worth noting: the policy is sold as a reclaiming of strength, yet institutional stakeholders say the Minuteman III fleet “may” be viable through 2050 only because the Sentinel replacement is delayed. We are signaling strength while quietly admitting to extended vulnerability. That contradiction weakens – rather than strengthens – deterrence credibility.
For Washington to rebuild credible deterrence, three things must align: capability, credibility, and calculation.
Capability means the force is reliable, secure, modern enough to penetrate adversary defenses or hold their decision-centers at risk. The audit by the GAO suggests the aging ICBM system has more years than previously thought, but reliability questions remain.
Credibility means adversaries believe the U.S. will use nuclear weapons if its vital interests are threatened. Credibility is undermined when signaling tactics look inconsistent or ad hoc.
Calculation means policymaking acknowledges the full spectrum of risks, from escalation to misperception to arms racing. If testing resumes without corresponding arms-control dialogue, the world may enter an era of acceleration and uncertainty.
One can imagine several unintended effects. Russia may declare readiness to resume its own nuclear tests in response – something already under discussion in Moscow. China may accelerate its arsenal expansion, convinced U.S. resolve rests more on rhetoric than restraint. Regional proliferators may see new wiggle room.
In that scenario, all of those players will interpret America’s noisy signaling as a green light to proceed optimistically. That is the risk: the sleeper is not the missile, it is the signal.
Strategy is not about the loudest boom, it is about the most credible vow. A truly effective deterrent whispers, “We do not want war – but we know how to win it.” Testing to show that we “can win it” may satisfy domestic political theatre, but strategic peace demands a deeper argument: we will not start it, but if we must, we will finish it – and then stop.
If Washington truly wishes to deter, not provoke, it must pair its muscle with clear doctrine and calibrated signaling. It must reaffirm treaty frameworks – or build credible exit strategies – while avoiding ambiguity that invites miscalculation. It must calibrate costs, not only in dollars but in risk, alliance credibility, and strategic stability.
